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Abstract
Between 1990 and 2005, 14 percent of the world's public firms were targets in a minority block acquisition, of which one third are cross-border in nature. These firms are mostly financially constrained with high growth opportunities and experience significant increases in their stock prices at the announcement. Financially constrained targets that have joint ventures or alliances with the corporate acquirers experience largest increases in their stock price. In the immediate two years following the acquisition, 27 percent of target firms issue new equity and the increase in the amount of net equity issuances is large. These findings are consistent with the conclusion that equity stake purchases by other corporations are useful in alleviating asymmetric information faced by target firms in raising external capital. There is little evidence that corporate blockowners lower contracting costs in the product market, effectively monitor insiders or capitalize on their overvalued stocks.
Between 1990 and 2005, 14 percent of public firms around the world were targets in a minority block acquisition, with the fraction of acquired equity averaging 16 percent.
1 There is also large cross-country variation in corporate block acquisition activities. Thirty-three percent of public firms were targets in a minority block acquisition in Spain and Portugal but only 5 percent of public firms were targets in South Korea. Why do firms sell equity stakes to other corporations? Why do corporations purchase partial equity stakes in other firms? How do cross-country differences in law and regulation influence the motives and the consequences of corporate block acquisitions? Largely unanswered, these questions have imminent relevance with the current financial turmoil in the U.S.
For example, Morgan Stanley has recently agreed to sell an equity stake of as much as $8.5 billion to top Japanese bank Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.
Existing research offers a number of possible explanations for why corporations purchase (sell) equity stakes from (to) other firms. For example, equity can play a key role in bonding business partners facing high contracting costs (see Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee et al. (2006) ). And large multinational firms could use partial acquisitions to access local advantages possessed by local firms (Dunning (1992) ). Alternatively, the target firm is financially constrained and faces severe information asymmetry in raising external capital. An equity stake purchase by a fully-informed outside firm could resolve asymmetric information about the target firm value and relieve the target's constraints. It is also likely that corporate blockholders can be effective monitors of or share controls with large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Gomes and Novaes (2006) ). Finally, corporations potentially acquire blocks as a way of capitalizing a strong currency or overvaluation of their own stocks (Froot and Stein (1991) and Baker et al. (2007) ).
This is the first international study on corporate block acquisitions, examining the extent to which these various theories explain corporate block acquisitions. I consider a sample of 24,143 completed minority block acquisitions by corporations announced between 1990 and 2005. This is a much larger sample than any sample examined by previous studies, all of which solely focus on the U.S. firms. 2 Yet almost a third of the targets are in Continental Europe, followed by Asia. That U.S.
firms are targets in only less than 25 percent of the world's minority block acquisitions is puzzling since more than 65 percent of the world's majority control acquisitions target the U.S. firms. 3 In addition to the ownership difference from mergers, block acquisitions are much more frequently 1 A minority block acquisition is one in which the acquirer purchases more than 5 percent and less than 50 percent of the target's shares. 2 Allen and Phillips (2000) examine a sample of 402 large block acquisitions from 1981 to 1990 . Fee et al. (2006 consider only 300 equity stakes in their customer-supplier pairs. Kang and Kim (2008) examine a sample of 799 partial acquisitions in the U.S. during the 1990 and 1999 period. 3 Majority control transactions are ones in which the acquirer purchases more than 50 percent of the target's shares.
conducted through private negotiations, with cash as a single method of payment in more than 90 percent of all transactions.
Overall, I find that selling equity stakes allows target firms to relieve their financial constraints and take advantage of investment opportunities. Targets are mostly financially constrained firms with high growth opportunities. Constrained targets experience larger increases in their stock prices at the announcement compared to non-constrained targets, especially in the presence of joint venture or alliances with the acquirers. Thirty-six percent of constrained targets issue new equity and raise thirty-two percent of their market capitalization within two years subsequent to the equity stake purchases. Furthermore, constrained targets experience larger increases in their operating cash flows, sales and investment expenditures compared to non-constrained targets. These findings are robust to different proxies of target firms' financing constraints including dividend payments and a newly developed index by Whited and Wu (2006) .
I find little evidence for other motives. First, target firms do not tend to operate in R&D-intensive sectors. Nor do target firms in high R&D sectors earn abnormally high returns or experience better operating performance ex post. This is different from the predictions of the contracting motive in the product market context. Second, there is no evidence for the governance role of corporate blockholders. I find that firms with high insider ownership or from weak law countries are not more likely to be targets in the block purchases. Further, firms from weak law countries experience lower announcement returns and are less likely to issue new equity, inconsistent with the predictions of the governance motive. Finally, there is little evidence that target firms are mostly from countries that undergo currency depreciation or lower market returns, which would be consistent with the market timing motive. Though public acquirers have high stock returns prior to the acquisition, only 43 percent of the acquirers are public firms. Further, target firms experienced higher increases in stock prices at the announcement when purchased by corporations with high prior stock returns. Capitalizing on over-valued stocks is unlikely the motive of block acquisitions.
Using the subsample on minority block acquisitions in the U.S., I find evidence consistent with prior studies. In particular, I find that corporations purchase equity stakes in other firms to lower contracting costs in high R&D industries, such as chemicals and drugs. However, when I include the data for the rest of the world, this finding is no longer significant. Overall, the characteristics of target firms in these minority block acquisitions, the higher announcement returns and the larger quantity of subsequent equity issuances for financially constrained targets paint a clear picture that corporate block acquisitions help relieve financial constraints of target firms.
My paper contributes to the growing literature on corporate investors. Prior studies that examine this specific type of investors have emphasized their strategic interaction with the target firms (Allen and Phillips (2000) , Fee et al. (2006) and Barclay et al. (2008) ), their monitoring role in the targets (Kang and Kim (2008) ), and their impact (or lack of) on dividend policy of the targets (Barclay et al. (2008) ). Using a comprehensive dataset on corporate investors around the world, I document their prevalence and usefulness in mitigating information asymmetry between target firms and outside shareholders to relieve their financial constraints.
My findings also add to the law and finance literature. Previous studies on corporate governance show that differences in laws and enforcement are correlated with the development of capital markets, the ownership structure of firms, and the cost of capital (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) ). Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that the volume of mergers and acquisitions activity is significantly higher in strong law countries, consistent with the view that high market frictions, such as agency and transaction costs, prevent efficient transfer of control. I find that corporate block acquisitions do not serve as effective governance mechanisms in weak law countries.
Finally, this study helps to fill out a more complete picture of how financially constrained firms fund their growth opportunities. Previous studies have documented that firms use cash, lines of credit, or trade credit to overcome capital market frictions for funding future projects (Almeida et al. (2004) , Opler et al. (1999) , Petersen and Rajan (1997) , and Sufi (2007)); an ADR listing improves access to capital (Reese and Weisbach (2002)) especially for firms facing higher barriers to access capital (Lins et al. (2005) ); managers increase their ownership when firms are financially constrained because they may be the cheapest providers of external funding (Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2008) ). This paper finds that equity stake sales to outside corporations also help to relieve financial constraints and are frequently used by firms around the world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses possible causes and consequences of corporate block acquisitions. Section 3 presents data and deal statistics. Section 4 examines the firm characteristics and whether proxies of the theorized benefits of block acquisitions are systematically related to the presence of equity stakes in the target firms. Section 5 presents results on announcement returns of target firms. Subsequent new equity issuances are examined in Section 6, followed by analyses on the target firms' investment expenditures, sales and operating profitability in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes the paper.
Potential Explanations for Corporate Partial Block Purchases
In this section, I discuss possible reasons for minority block acquisitions by corporations. In each sub-section, I discuss predictions of existing theories as well as findings of empirical studies and derive hypotheses I test in this paper.
Product Market Relationships and the Contracting Motive
In the context of a product market relationship, equity stakes can be regarded as a form of partial integration between two firms. There is extensive theoretical discussion of the factors that influence full or shared ownership between trade partners. 4 Earlier studies focus on explaining full integration as one way to organize a trading relationship and generally regard partial ownership to be suboptimal (Williamson (1979) , Klein et al. (1978), and Grossman and Hart (1986) ). Subsequent work identifies circumstances in which joint ownership could be optimal, including settings with incomplete information (see Aghion and Tirole (1994) ). An alternative view of partial ownership is that it mitigates the underinvestment problem without diluting the target's incentives too much. The underinvestment problem occurs when one party does not want to invest in actions that help the other party (e.g. Mathews (2006)).
These theories predict that partial equity stakes increase with business relationships that are characterized by a high degree of asset specificity and/or in the presence of noncontractible decisions.
Further, equity stakes encourage more relationship-specific investment and more stable partnerships.
An empirical proxy for an incomplete-contracting environment could be research and development (R&D) expenses in a sector. As argued by Aghion and Tirole (1994) , property rights become blurry when it comes to R&D activities. R&D activities of one party can easily benefit the other party in ways outside of any contracting scope. In addition, when business partners share knowledge in cooperating, it is hard to write all contingencies in contracts.
Prior U.S. studies have found a number of results consistent with the contracting motive.
Firms are more likely to sell equity stakes to their customer in high R&D sector (Fee et al. (2006) ), exhibit larger increases in announcement returns and improvements in operating performance in high R&D sectors especially when they have joint ventures or alliances with their corporate acquirers (Allen and Phillips (2000) ), and have higher success rates when they have a strategic overlap with their corporate venture parent (Gompers and Lerner (2000)). In the context of foreign direct investment, existing empirical work suggests that firms select ownership levels that economize on transaction costs (see Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) ), facilitate the coordination of pricing and production decisions (Kant (1990)), learn from their local partners (Kogut (1991) ) and curry favors with host government (Henisz (2000)). Desai et al. (2004) find a marked decline in the use of partial ownership by multinational firms over the last 20 years and conclude that the forces of globalization appear to have diminished the use of shared ownership.
In this study, I examine predictions of the contracting motive on the characteristics, the announcement returns, subsequent operating performance, and investment expenditures of target firms. I use high R&D industry dummy as a proxy for high contracting costs and a dummy indicating the presence of joint ventures or alliances as a proxy for product market relationship.
Financial Constraints and the Financing Motive
An alternative reason for partial equity stakes is that firms lacking financial slack sell equity to a well-informed corporation. Firms facing high asymmetric information problem in the capital markets often seek financing from intermediaries, such as commercial banks (Fama (1985) and James (1987)), private placement investors (Hertzel and Smith (1993) ), and venture capitalists (Chan (1983) ) that can conduct intensive ex-ante due-diligence and ex-post monitoring. However these due-diligence and monitoring activities are often costly to the intermediaries and therefore they charge higher rates to compensate these costs. In contrast, an outside corporation might already possess substantial knowledge and experience in an industry that makes it a cheaper provider of external finance (see Petersen and Rajan (1997) for trade partnerships).
A few predictions follow from the financing motive. First, firms facing difficulties in raising capital are more likely to sell equity stakes to other corporations. Second, targets experience higher announcement returns and larger increases in their operating profitability when they are ex-ante financially constrained. Last, compared to targets that are not financially constrained ex-ante, financially-constrained targets are more likely to issue equity subsequently and to raise larger amount of capital.
With the exception of Allen and Phillips (2000) , Pablo and Subramaniam (2002) and Fee et al. (2006) , prior studies of partial equity stakes largely ignore the role of financial frictions. The findings of the studies that examine the financing motive are mixed. As well put by Fee et al. (2006) "the types of financial frictions and the mechanism by which they lead to partner financing are quite murky."
In this paper, I examine implications of the financing motive on the characteristics, announcement returns, subsequent operating performance, investment expenditures, and equity issuances of target firms. There are various proxies for financial constraints that have been proposed and which particular measure is best is a matter of debate in the literature (see Almeida et al. (2004) ). I include two widely used proxies including a dummy variable indicating that the firm does not pay dividends (see Fazzari et al. (1988) ) and a composite index of financial constraints based on a standard intertemporal investment Column augmented to account for financial frictions (see Whited and Wu (2006) ).
Investor Protection and the Governance Motive
Corporate governance literature has emphasized the monitoring role of outside shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Pagano and Roell (1998) and Bloch and Hege (2001) ). Yet, monitoring does not necessarily assure value-maximizing policies (see Grossman and Hart (1986) for a model of under-monitoring and Burkart et al. (1997) for a model of excessive monitoring by large shareholders). Recent studies emphasize shared control among multiple large shareholders, especially in closely-held firms, as an effective governance mechanism that could increase firm value (see Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Gomes and Novaes (2006) ).
These theoretical models of large blockholders can be very specialized. Thus it is hard to interpret them as literal descriptions of typical multi-dimensional corporate blockowners. Nonetheless, this work suggests that corporate blockholders could play a role in an environment characterized by severe agency problems. In addition, target firms experience higher announcement returns and larger increases in their operating profitability when they face more severe agency problems. Empirically, insider ownership is often used as a proxy for the agency cost in the target firm (see Faccio and Lang (2002) , and Doidge et al. (2008) ). Weak Law and poor legal protection can also be used as a proxy for severe agency problems due to market frictions; these market frictions limit access to information and result in ineffective corporate control market (see La Porta et al. (1997) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) ).
Existing empirical studies on blockholders have focused on the effect of multiple blockholders on firm value. A number of papers show that multiple blockholders increase firm value by crossmonitoring. 5 Other studies show that the effect of multiple blockholders on firms varies across countries depending on whether blockholders cross-monitor or cooperate with each other to expropriate outside minority shareholders (see Redding (1995) and Faccio et al. (2001) ). However, this literature has been silent on the identity of multiple blockholders except for the family blockholders. Fewer studies examine corporate blockholders and find mixed results. For example, Allen and Phillips (2000) find no evidence that corporate blockholders effectively monitor target firms whereas Kang and Kim (2008) find that corporate blockholders, especially those geographically close to targets, can actively pursue post-acquisition governance activities in target firms including board representation and replacing poorly performing target management.
In this study, I examine implications of the governance motive for corporate blockholders on the characteristics, announcement returns, subsequent operating performance, investment expenditures, and equity issuances of target firms. I use high insider ownership and a newly assembled anti-self dealing index as proxies for governance problems (Djankov et al. (2007) ). I also use a dummy variable indicating a foreign acquirer as a proxy for higher monitoring costs (Kang and Kim (2008) ).
Market Conditions and the Timing Motive
Market conditions can also influence firms' decision to be involved in a minority block acquisition. Recent theories on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) predict that misvaluation drives mergers (see Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) , Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Dong et al. (2006) ). In the cross-border context, not only stock market valuation but also currency valuation can affect the decision to be an acquirer in the M&As (see Froot and Stein (1991) , Baker et al. (2007) and Desai et al. (2007) ).
These theories would predict that firms likely become targets in a minority block acquisition by other corporations that have cheaper capital or an overvalued currency. Furthermore, unlike previous hypotheses, target firms do not necessarily benefit or lose from these acquisitions if the medium of the transaction is cash.
Existing studies on M&As have found that high market to book ratios coincide with periods of intense merger activity, especially in stock-financed deals. Multinational firms engage in cross-border arbitrage. Specifically, FDI flows increase sharply with source country market valuations (see Baker et al. (2007) ) and multinational firms increase their investments in countries that undergo currency depreciation episodes (see Desai et al. (2007) ).
In this paper, I examine implications of the market timing motive on the characteristics of both target firms and acquirer firms. Further, I examine whether announcement returns, subsequent operating performance and equity issuance activities of target firms differ depending on whether acquirers have higher stock returns prior to the acquisition. I use both target and acquirer firm prior stock returns as well as exchange returns as proxies for market conditions. Starting with all partial equity purchases reported in SDC, I first eliminate those observations in which the acquirer owns more than 50 percent before the deal or less than 5 percent after the deal.
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Then I exclude acquisitions involving either target or bidder or both from outside of La Porta, LopezDe-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1997) 49 countries and from countries that involve less than 10 targets during the sample period. I also filter out deals that either lack information on the percentage of the target acquired or has this information but is inconsistent with the percentage held before and after by more than one percentage point. A total of 20,620 deals were dropped using these initial filters. I then exclude the following deals from my sample:
(a) The target's ultimate parents and the acquirer's ultimate parents are the same: 2,383 deals.
(b) The acquirer firm already had more than 20 percent equity in the target firm at the time of announcement: 1,415 deals.
(c) The acquirer is an individual investor: 2,487 deals.
(d) The acquirer is a government agency: 1,999 deals.
(e) The target is owned by government: 826 deals.
(f) The target operates in the utility industry: 1,045 deals.
(g) The target operates in the financial industry: 8,971 deals.
After applying these filters, I have a sample of 24,143 minority block acquisitions in 43 countries involving 18,939 target firms with the total transaction value of $810 billion.
7 Table 1 summarizes the distribution of these block acquisitions across the 43 target countries in our sample. I also report each country's legal origin as a proxy for the level of investor protection in each country (La Porta et al. (1998) ) and a newly assembled anti-self dealing index (Djankov et al. (2006) One concern with the current definition of minority block acquisition is that the purchasing corporation has gained majority control even with less than 50 percent ownership of the target firm.
Recent research on ownership and control structures of firms around the world has chosen 20 percent as a critical cutoff for defining effective control (LLS(1999) , Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens et al. (2000) ).
14 Nevertheless, to address these potential concerns, I examine the sensitivity of my results to different ownership cutoff level in all subsequent analysis. A related concern is that the purchasing corporation can still be control-motivated and use the minority block as its toehold in the target firm, resulting in transitory block positions. Since strategies of successful/failed takeovers are not within the scope of this study, I eliminate 178 deals in which the firm is subsequently merged with the blockholder during a two-year period following the equity purchase. I also eliminate 140 deals in which the acquiring corporation subsequently sold its shares during a two-year period.
Using Worldscope, I calculate various firm characteristics, namely size, operating performance, growth opportunities, leverage, investment and ADR listing. 15 Firm size is measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Return on assets is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by book value of total assets. Book leverage is the ratio of longterm debt to book value of total assets. Sales growth is the one-year inflation-adjusted growth in sales.
Market-to-book is calculated as the book value of total assets subtracting the book value of equity and adding the market value of equity and divided by the book value of total assets. Investment expenditures are calculated as the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures and net assets from
acquisitions. An ADR dummy indicates whether the firm has an ADR listing in the year under consideration. Table III provides a comparison of these summary statistics for target firms and non-target firms. For each target firm of a given year, I benchmark it with non-target firms in the same country to 12 Cash dummy is equal to 1 if SDC indicates that the deal is paid entirely in cash. Only 48 percent of the target firms in M&As are paid in cash (see Rossi and Volpin (2004) ). 13 When SDC reports voting ownership of the stakes, I use voting ownership instead of cash flow ownership. Only 53 events have differential cash flow ownership and voting ownership. 14 Regulatory authorities in many countries regard 30 percent ownership as a critical cutoff for effective control. According to Dyck and Zingales (2004) , the median threshold that triggers a mandatory tender offer of remaining shares is 30 percent. The typical example is U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 15 Observations that have lower than $1 million in book value of assets or have negative book value of equity are discarded. Financial and utility firms are also excluded. mitigate impact of cross-country differences in financial reporting practices. 16 Firms that are ultimately targets in the minority block acquisitions are included in the non-target category in all years except the announcement year. 17 Compared to a typical firm in the same country, the target firm in minority block acquisitions is smaller. However, the size difference is mainly driven by the U.S. targets; non-U.S. targets are about the same size, or a little larger, than the average firm in their country. Target firms have higher leverage than non-targets. In terms of operating performance, target firms have lower EBITDA than non-targets. That target firms have higher leverage and lower profitability could indicate that they are in financial distress; however, their sales growth is significantly higher than nontargets and their investment expenditures are similar to non-targets. Target firms are also more likely have an ADR listing than non-target firms.
I also include key variables used in testing implications of various motives. 18 For the contracting motive, I construct a high R&D dummy which is equal to one if the firm operates in the upper tercile of all industries by their median firm R&D expenses. I find that targets are less likely to operate in high R&D industries than the typical firm in their country. This univariate statistic suggests that the contracting motive for partial equity purchases does not hold up in the sample. For the governance motive, I also use two dummies measuring governance problems. The high closely-held shares dummy is set to one if the firm's insider ownership is in the upper tercile of all Worldscope firms in that year. 19 The low anti-self dealing index (ASDI) dummy is equal to one if the country's ASDI is lower than the world median (see Djankov et al. (2007) ). Univariate test suggests that target firms have lower insider ownership, which is the opposite of the predication of the governance motive; however target firms are more likely from countries with a low ASDI index, consistent with the prediction of the governance motive.
Finally, for the market timing motive I examine firm level stock returns, country level stock returns and currency performance. The dummy variable indicating low country market returns in the prior year is equal to one if the firm's country-level cumulative 12 month stock market return is lower than the world median in that year. The currency depreciation dummy equals one if the real exchange rate increases by over 25 percent compared to the value of the exchange rate one year earlier. I also include public acquirers' 12 month cumulative stock returns both prior to the acquisition and after the acquisition. Univariate test suggests that target firms have lower prior stock returns than non-target firms and public acquirers have high stock returns in the year prior to the acquisition, consistent with the market timing motive.
Which Firms Have Corporate Blockholders?
In this section, I examine which firms are likely to be targets in corporate block acquisitions.
Logit models are estimated where the dependent variable is set to one if the firm is the target in a minority block acquisition. Firm-level controls include firm size and leverage. I include two countrylevel variables-GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP-to control for economic and financial development. All specifications include year fixed effects with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by a firm's two-digit SIC code. Table IV reports marginal effects of logit regression results.
Columns (1) through (4) include all key variables in one regression model but incorporate two dummies for financial constraints one at a time. In columns (6) and (7), I examine a non-U.S. sample and a post-1998 sample, respectively.
Financially constrained firms are more likely to be targets in a minority block acquisition. The probability of a firm selling equity stakes to another corporation increases one percent when the firm is and this disclosure is often voluntary. For detailed discussions of the reliability of this variable, see Kho et al. (2008) . a non-dividend payer. This is equivalent to a thirty-three percent increase for the average firm with three percent probability of being targeted in a minority block acquisition in a given year. The probability of a financially constrained firm selling equity stakes increases 0.3 percent when the firm also has high sales growth, equivalent to a 10 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving investment from another corporation. 20 These results are even stronger when other variables are added.
When I use the high WW index dummy as a proxy for financial constraints, the probability of a firm receiving equity stakes increases 0.3 percent. This increase is equivalent to a 10 percent increase for the average firm. Although the coefficient on the high WW index dummy is economically less significant than the coefficient on the dividend dummy, it is always statistically significant.
Firms in high R&D industries are less likely to be targets in a partial equity acquisition, which
is opposite to what the contracting motive predicts. Firms with higher insider ownership are also less likely to be targets in a block acquisition and the coefficient on low ASDI dummy is not significant, contradicting the predictions of the monitoring motive. Furthermore, contrary to the cheap-capital motive, both target firm's stock returns and target firm's exchange returns are not significant. Tough the univariate analysis suggests that public acquirers have much higher stock returns in the year prior to the partial equity acquisition, acquirers' stock returns could also be a proxy for their growth opportunities. I will examine target announcement returns in the next section, which will better differentiate these two effects.
Because both the SDC sample and the matched SDC-Worldscope sample are likely to be biased toward the U.S. firms, it is possible that my findings are driven mainly by the U.S. firms.
Therefore for robustness, I examine the non-U.S. firms (columns (7.A) and (7.B) of Table IV ). Also I examine the post-1998 sample (columns (8.A) and (8.B) of Table IV) , since, as discussed earlier, the coverage in Worldscope for non-U.S. firms is much better after 1998.
Using only non-U.S. firms, I find that the zero-dividend dummy becomes even more significant. After incorporating all firm-level controls, the probability of a zero-dividend firm receiving equity stakes in the non-U.S. sample is 0.7 percent higher than a dividend payer. It is a 30 percent increase for an average firm that has an average 2.5 percent probability of receiving equity stakes. The high WW index dummy becomes not significant in the non-U.S. sample, but the interaction term between each financial constraint dummy and sales growth is always significantly positive. Therefore target firms are mostly financially constrained with good growth opportunities. For other hypotheses, the results in the non-U.S. sample are similar to the whole sample.
Considering the sample period after 1998, I find that both financial constraint dummies become not significant. But financially constrained firms with high growth opportunities ex-ante are significantly more likely targeted in partial equity acquisitions. These results suggest that target firms are not in distress. They have high sales growth and high capital needs. Target firms' prior stock returns become significantly negative, consistent with the prediction of the market timing motive.
However, currency depreciation dummy is also significantly negative, which is opposite of the prediction of the market timing motive. For other hypotheses, the results in the post-1998 sample are similar to the whole sample.
The results in this section show strong support for the financing motive. Firms that are financially constrained with high growth opportunities are more likely to be targets in partial equity acquisitions. For the contracting and the monitoring motive, I do not find supporting evidence. For the cheap-capital motive, none of the proxies for the target firm is significant, though in the univariate analysis public acquirers in partial equity acquisitions experienced 29 percent annual returns prior to the acquisition. Since prior stock returns of the purchasing firm could also be a proxy for its growth opportunities, I examine target announcement returns in the next section to differentiate the two possibilities.
The Announcement Effects of Minority Block Acquisitions
In this section, I examine the excess returns for both the target and the acquirer at the announcement of the partial block acquisition. The analysis in the last section reveals that financially constrained firms with high growth opportunities are most likely to sell partial equity stakes to other corporations. The reliability of such analysis depends critically on the assumption that the sample of equity stakes is unbiased. This section examines market reaction to the acquisitions, which is not sensitive to omission of unobserved equity stakes. I first summarize the excess returns at the announcement and the premium paid for the partial equity stake in the univariate analysis. Then I examine the determinants of announcement returns in multivariate tests. Last I exploit measures of acquirer information advantages and test whether such information advantage affects announcement returns.
Univariate Analysis
To assess the valuation effects of partial equity acquisitions, I compute cumulative market adjusted buy-and-hold returns over a 21 day period (-10, +10) centered at announcement date. I use a long window because of the possibility that announcements of this type may not be reported until several days after the actual purchase (see Allen and Phillips (2000) ).
21 Table V presents the announcement-period excess stock returns to target firms, purchasing firms and the combined excess returns of both target firms and corporate blockowners. The premium for these blocks, calculated as the price paid over the target firm's stock price 4 weeks prior to the acquisition, is also included in the analysis. However, only about one third of the sample has premium information.
For the full sample, an average target firm earns statistically significant 8 percent cumulative abnormal return during the announcement period. It is within the range of excess returns found in existing studies. 22 The purchasing firm also experiences an average 1.2 percent wealth gain over a 21 day period (-10, +10) centered at announcement date, economically much smaller than the target firm.
Since the average purchasing firm is much larger than the target firm (the median acquirer is about 13 times the target firm), the combined return is also economically much smaller than the target return, but most of these returns are still statistically significant. This result for the purchasing firm is different from what Allen and Phillips (2000) find in their sample of 402 minority block purchases in the U.S. firms during 1980s. They find a mere 0.02 percent for the combined returns. 23 The average premium paid for these blocks over the target stock price 4 weeks prior to the acquisition is 14 percent. Following the existing studies, I will focus discussion below on returns of target firms.
For the subgroup analysis, I find significantly higher target returns when they operate in high R&D industries, are financially constrained, are from strong law countries, and sell equity stakes to acquirers in the upper quartile of prior stock returns. Whether the target firm has high insider ownership or whether the acquiring firm is foreign does not affect the target announcement returns.
These univariate comparisons are consistent with the predictions of the contracting motive and the financing motive but opposite to the predictions of the governance motive and the timing motive. That target firms experience more value gains when acquirers have high prior stock returns suggests that prior returns of purchasing corporations are a proxy of their growth opportunities rather than overvalued capital. Furthermore, there is no evidence that public acquirers with higher prior stock returns pay differently for the equity stakes. However, the significantly higher target returns for firms operating in high R&D industries can be partly explained by the higher premium paid by the acquirers in these transactions. I find no evidence that the value gains of financially constrained targets are driven by overpaid stakes. Finally, the premium paid for partial equity stakes in weak law countries 21 I also examine mean excess returns over different event windows such as (-5, +5), (-2, +2) as well as (-20, +20). The result holds robust. 22 Kang and Kim (2008) find 9 percent abnormal returns in their out-of-state partial equity acquisition and Allen and Phillips (2000) find 6.9 percent in their full sample of minority block acquisition. 23 The difference could be due to: (1) firm size, as target firms in my sample are much larger than other studies or (2) event study methodology, as I use market-adjusted returns rather than employ the traditional event study methodology using a market model because of the cross-country nature.
and cross-border deals is almost 10 percent higher than that in strong law countries and domestic deals. That blocks are traded at a higher premium in weak law countries suggests that corporate blockholders are willing to pay a higher price for equity blocks that allow them to extract private benefits of control (see Dyck and Zingales (2004) for a cross-country comparison of block premiums).
Multivariate Analysis
To gain more insights into the determinants of excess returns of target firms at the announcement, I examine factors that could influence the target returns in a multivariate setting. I estimate regression models using the target firm cumulative excess returns during (-10, +10) centered at the announcement. The independent variables include a high R&D dummy, a zero-dividend dummy, a high WW index dummy, a high closely-held shares dummy, a cross-border dummy, a high ASDI dummy and finally a high acquirer prior stock return dummy. The definitions and statistics of these variables are summarized in section 3. All specifications include year fixed effects with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Table VI Table V . There is strong evidence for the financing motive. Coefficients on both proxies of financially constrained target firms are statistically significant and economically large. After I control for high R&D industries, insider ownership, cross-border deals, target country's legal protection and acquirers' high prior stock returns, the financially constrained target always earns a significant 2.4 percent or 4.4 percent higher return.
For the contracting motive, the high R&D dummy becomes not significant once I control for other factors. For the governance motive, the coefficients on high insider ownership dummy and the cross-border deal dummy are always not significant. The low ASDI dummy is significantly negative, suggesting that outside investors benefit less from corporate blockholders in weak law countries. For the market timing motive, target firms earn higher returns when acquirers experience higher prior stock returns, which suggests that these acquirers bring more benefit rather than simply trying to capitalize on their overvalued stocks. are not affected by the mandatory tender offer rules.
I omit detailed discussions for each motive because the results in all of the sub-sample analysis are consistent with those in the full-sample. The financing motive finds strong support in the sub-samples. On average, financially constrained targets experience 2 percent to 4 percent higher returns than non-constrained. There is no evidence for the contracting motive, the governance motive and the timing motive.
Joint Venture/Alliances
If target firms sell equity stakes to outside corporations to raise capital, then corporate where the firms involved invest assets or hold equity interests in the venture. Agreements and alliances are explicit contracts to supply products or services, manufacture products, market or distribute products, license the rights to product or distribute of product, conduct research and development activities, and share existing technologies or methods. 648 partial equity stakes are purchased by corporations that have product market relationship with target firms in one form or another. I find that both the related industry dummy and the financial constraint dummy are significantly positive. But the interaction term is not significant. Inferences for other variables are qualitatively similar to the findings before. The JV/alliance dummy is not significant by itself.
However both the financial constraint dummy and the interaction between the JV/alliance and financial constraint dummy are reliably significant. Thus financially constrained targets benefit the most when the purchasing corporation is a business partner and therefore has a higher information advantage regarding the investment opportunities of the target firm.
Previous studies have found that target firms in high R&D industries that are acquired by their business partners experience high returns (see Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee et al. (2006)), consistent with the contracting motive. In the last section, I have found that firms in high R&D industries are not more likely to be targets in partial equity acquisitions and experience insignificant announcement returns. In Table VIII sample, the dummy variables indicating a high R&D industry and JVAs are both significant even after I include other controls, which is consistent with the previous U.S. studies (Allen and Phillips (2000) ).
This result is consistent with the finding in Table 1 that the U.S. targets are more likely in high R&D industries compared to the rest of the world. It is important to emphasize that the financial constraint dummy is always significantly positive regardless of the specification and sample I use.
Overall, I find strong support for the financing motive. Financially constrained targets experience higher announcement returns. Moreover, target firms benefit the most when the purchasing corporation has superior information about the investment opportunities of the target firm through partnership. The evidence for the contracting motive, the governance motive and the market timing motive is weak or mixed at best.
New Equity Issuance
This section further tests the financing motive by examining equity issuance activities of target These equity issuances raised $187 billion in total, which is 17 percent of total market capitalization of all issuing firms. One third of target firms subsequently raised equity, of which the average firm raised 1.7 times. To gauge the quantity of these issues, I use two benchmarks. First, I compare them to the period prior to the acquisition for the same firms. During the two years prior to the acquisition, the entire sample of issuing firms has only 550 offerings and raised $38 billion, about 17 percent of the total amount raised subsequent to the acquisition. Second, I compare the target firm with a sizematched industry peer. 27 During the two-year period subsequent to the acquisition announcement, only 1,139 industry peers issued subsequent equity and raised $112 billion in total. The target firms raised 70 percent more capital than their industry-size matched peers.
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I also compare the percentage of target firms issuing subsequent equity and the median proceeds to market capitalization across subgroups of target firms. Univariate analysis shows that exante financially constrained targets are significantly more likely to issue equity and raise larger amount of equity than those unconstrained firms. There is also a significant difference in equity issuances across countries with different levels of investor protection. Target firms from strong law countries are much more likely to issue equity and raise larger amount of equity in the two years subsequent to the acquisition compared to those in weak law countries. This finding is consistent with those of existing studies in the law and finance literature (see La Porta et al. (1997) ). Table X examines the determinants of subsequent equity issuances. In Panel A, a logit model is estimated on the probability that a target firm in the minority block acquisition will issue new equity in the subsequent two years of minority block acquisitions. In Panel B, a Tobit model is estimated using the total proceeds from new equity issuances within two years of minority block acquisitions scaled by market capitalization. All specifications include year fixed effects with heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors. Both panels report marginal effects.
The results presented in Panel A are consistent with the financing motive. I find that the probability of equity issuance increases nine percent when the target is a zero-dividend firm or when 27 The industry peer for each sample firm is constructed using the firm closest in size to the target firm within the same four-digit SIC industry. If five firms are not available with matching four-digit SIC, I use three-digit, twodigit and one-digit in turn to find matching firms until at least five firms excluding the target firm are present in the target industry. 28 I also use cash flow statements to construct net debt issues and net equity issues in the period (-2, +2) centered at the acquisition year. I find that patterns of net equity issues based on cash flow statements are consistent with those of new equity issues based on SDC data. Prior to the acquisition, the mean net equity issues are five to seven percent of firm total assets. Subsequent to the acquisition, the mean net equity issues are 14 to 15 percent of firm total assets. Net debt issues have also increased after the acquisition, but with a much smaller magnitude, averaging from two to three percent before the acquisition and four to six percent after the acquisition.
the target is ranked in the upper tercile of all firms in the WW index. Target firms with high sales growth are also more likely to raise subsequent equity though the economic magnitude is much smaller. The probability of equity issuances decreases 13 percent when the target firm is in weak law countries, consistent with the higher cost of capital in weak law countries (see La Porta et al. (1997) ).
Panel B presents similar results as those in Panel A except that sales growth becomes insignificant. Financially constrained targets and targets in strong law countries raised significantly more equity subsequent to the block acquisition. There is again no evidence for the contracting, the governance and the market timing motive. The amount of proceeds raised subsequent to the partial equity stakes does not depend on whether the firm operates in high R&D industry, has high insider ownership, acquired by foreign corporations or by public corporations with high prior stock returns.
Overall, target firms in minority block acquisitions raise substantial equity capital in the immediate 2 years subsequent to the block purchase. Those ex-ante financially constrained target firms are most likely to raise new equity and when they do, they raise large quantities of new equity.
Therefore relieving financial constraints is likely one of the most important motivations behind the large volume of minority block purchases by corporations. There is also evidence that target firms in weak law countries are less likely to issue new equity and to raise smaller amounts, consistent with the higher cost of capital in weak law countries found by La Porta et al. (1997) .
The Longer-Run Impact of Corporate Blockholders on Target Firms
In this section, I provide further evidence on the motives of block acquisitions by examining changes in operating performance, sales and investment expenditures of target firms. To discriminate among various theories proposed in section 2, I design tests based on identifying, ex ante, the transactions most likely to be associated with each theoretical motive. For example, the contracting motive predicts that equity stakes in the target firm will encourage more relationship-specific investment and longer and more stable product market relation. Then target firms, especially those concerned with contracting costs ex-ante (e.g. those operating in high R&D industries), are likely to experience higher increases in their investment, sales and operating performance.
Univariate Analysis
I measure operating performance by changes in operating cash flows. 29 Investment is measured as the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenses and net assets from acquisitions.
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Changes in operating performance, sales and investment expenditures are scaled by average book 29 Operating cash flow is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). 30 Whenever R&D expenses or net assets from acquisitions are missing, they are set to zero.
value of assets during the three year period around the purchase year. 31 I include both R&D expenses and net assets from acquisitions in investment expenditures. The statistics are group means adjusted by a sample of size-matched firms in the same industry of the target firm. 32 Industry portfolios for each sample firm are constructed using five firms matched by industry (using four-digit SIC code) that are closest to the target firm in total assets excluding the target firm. If five firms are not available with matching four-digit SIC, I use three-digit, two-digit and one-digit, in turn, to find matching firms until at least five firms excluding the target firm are present in the target industry. Table X The patterns for sales growth reinforce the findings in operating cash flows. Overall, an average target firm experienced 16 percent increases in its sales through the third year following block purchases by corporations. Firms in high R&D industries experience higher increases in their sales but insignificantly different from those in low R&D industries. Financially constrained targets experience 37 percent increases in their sales through the third year whereas sales of unconstrained targets only increased 8 percent. These differences are both economically large and statistically significant.
For changes in investment expenditures, I find that investment spending for an average target firm increased 6 percent through the third year over and above its industry peers. Again, financially constrained targets experience 14 percent increases in their investment expenditures, almost 11 percent higher than unconstrained targets. For other groupings, I find insignificant differences across groups except for the low ASDI index dummy. Firms in weak law countries experienced two percent increase in their investment expenditures, almost five percent lower than those in strong law countries. 31 All variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent level to mitigate outliers. 32 Group medians yield similar results with smaller economic magnitudes. 33 Note that without industry adjustment, the increases in operating performance and investment expenditures are larger.
Multivariate Cross-sectional Evidence
To gain more insights into the changes in operating performance and investment expenditures, I examine determinants of these changes in a multivariate setting. I estimate the regression models using (-1, +3) industry-adjusted changes in operating cash flows, sales growth and investment expenditures calculated above. The independent variables are the same as those in the univariate analysis. All specifications include year fixed effects with heterscedasticity robust standard errors. Table XII Overall, operating cash flows, sales and investment expenditures increase for target firms, and there is strong evidence that financially constrained targets benefit the most from corporate block holdings. I find economically large and statistically significant differences between financially constrained targets and unconstrained ones in their subsequent increases in operating cash flows, sales and investment. When I examine whether financially constrained firms underperform their industry peers prior to the acquisition (not reported), I find that they have better operating performance than their industry peers and importantly do not under-invest. As for other motives such as contracting, governance and market timing, I find little supporting evidence in analyzing operating cash flows, sales and investment.
Conclusions
This paper finds that firms benefit from selling minority equity stakes to other corporations by relieving their financial constraints. Targets are mostly financially constrained firms with high growth opportunities. Compared to unconstrained targets, financially constrained target firms experience higher announcement returns, especially in the presence of joint venture or alliances with the acquirers. Thirty-six percent of constrained targets issue new equity and raise thirty-two percent of their market capitalization within two years subsequent to the equity stake purchases. Furthermore, constrained targets experience larger increases in their operating cash flows, sales and investment expenditures compared to non-constrained targets.
I propose and test alternative hypotheses for the motives of minority block purchases. I find little evidence for the contracting motive, the governance motive and the market timing motive.
Specifically, target firms in the minority block purchases are not more likely to operate in high R&D industries, to have high closely-held shares, to be from weak law countries, to have depreciated currency, or to have lower prior stock returns. Furthermore, target firms operating in high R&D industry, with high closely held shares, from weak law countries, and in cross-border deals do not experience higher stock returns or larger increases in their operating performance. To substantiate the evidence, I construct variables to proxy for product market relationships such as the existence of joint ventures or alliances between the target and the acquiring corporation. They are only significant in the U.S. sample. For the timing motive, I find that acquirers are more likely to experience high stock returns prior to the partial equity purchases. However, there is no evidence that target firms are more likely to have low prior stock returns or to come from countries undergo currency depreciation.
Further, target firms benefit more when acquirers had strong prior stock returns.
Corporate blockholders have been relatively well studied in the U.S. (see Allen and Phillip (2000) , Fee et al. (2006) , and Kang and Kim (2008)). However their presence, motives and impact internationally have not been studied before. I find that the intensity of minority block acquisition activity varies across countries and the pattern is very different from that of mergers and acquisitions.
For example, a public firm is more likely to be involved in a majority control acquisition when it is in a strong law country (see Rossi and Volpin (2004) ). There is no evidence that a public firm is more likely to be involved in a minority block acquisition when it is in a strong law country. If anything, partial acquisitions are much more common in countries with poor economic development. One explanation for this finding is that firms in weak law countries acquire minority stakes in other firms to form pyramidal business group and enjoy private benefit of control (see Kim (2008) ). However, the positive market valuation at the announcement of minority block acquisitions suggests that outside shareholders still benefit from such ownership structures, though not as much as those in strong law countries.
This study leaves some issues unresolved. First, the result that firms operating in high R&D industries do not have differential valuations is intriguing given what is established in the U.S. (see Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee et al. (2006)). Even after I control for the product market relationship using the existence of joint venture and alliances between the target firm and the purchasing firm, the high R&D dummy is still insignificant. Though for the U.S. subsample, the high R&D dummy is significant. Future work could shed light on why the motives of corporate block acquisitions differ between the U.S. and the rest of the world.
Secondly, I fail to find evidence for the governance motive. For the international sample, there is no reliable data source to identify governance activities that corporate blockholders undertake in the target firms such as managerial turnover (see Kang and Kim (2007) ). Future work with richer data on firm governance activities internationally could lead to more fruitful results.
Third, though I find some evidence for the timing motive of corporate block acquisitions, the results are not convincing. Insignificant differences on announcement returns, equity issuances, and operating performance between high acquirer prior stock returns and low acquirer prior stock returns are not inconsistent with the market timing motive. However, they do not necessarily by themselves support the motive. Future work should investigate specifically cross-border acquisitions to yield more insights.
Finally, I document a mechanism through which controlling shareholders in less developed countries can take advantage of growth opportunities. In the presence of many alternative mechanisms, such as cross-listing on U.S. exchanges (Doidge et al. (2004) ) or adopting better corporate governance practices (Durnev and Kim (2005) ), how important and effective is it to sell minority blocks to other corporations? Given the prevalence of these transactions around the world, we have a good reason to believe that it should be given more attention than it has to now. Deals that lack information on percentage of ownership acquired or has this information but is inconsistent with the percentage held before and after by more than one percentage point are exlucde. Deals in which the target and the acquirer has the same ultimate parent or the acquirer firm already had more than 20 percent equity in the target firm are excluded. Acquisitions with less than five percent blocks are also excluded. Finally, acquisitions involving either target or bidder or both from outside of La Porta et al. (1998) [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . I obtain initial sample of block acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database. I exclude deals that are mergers, acquisitions of majority control, LBOs, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender, exchange offers, repurchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations; deals that lack information on percentage of ownership acquired or has this information but is inconsistent with the percentage held before and after by more than one percentage point. I also exlcude all deals in which the target and the acquirer has the same ultimate parent or the acquirer firm already had more than 20 percent equity in the target firm. Acquisitions with less than 5 percent blocks are also excluded. Finally, acquisitions involving either target or bidder or both from outside of La Porta et al. (1998) 49 countries are deleted. Anti-self dealing index and civil law dummy are from Djankov et al. (2006) . Total value of transactions is based on 2005 dollars. Sub-samples include public targets, cross-border deals, financial acquirers (such as buyout firm, Venture Capital Company, merchant bank, commercial bank, etc.), related industry (overlapping SIC codes at the two-digit level), and targets in high R&D industries. High R&D industries are defined as those in the upper quartile of R&D expenditures divided by total net assets among all four-digit SIC industries on Compustat. For cross-border deals occurred after 1998 within European Union, they are classified as domestic. 
Table III Characteristics of target firms prior to the minority block acquisition
Characteristics of target and non-target firms taken from Datastream and WorldScope between 1989 and 2005 to match the availability of the SDCdata. Financial and utility firms are dropped. Target observations are firms on the SDC targeted in a completed minority block acquisition. Non-target observations are firms in the same country as the target observation. All observations are required to have book value of assets larger than $1 million and positive book value of equity and sales. Return on assets is measured as the ratio of EBITDA to book value of assets. Leverage is measured as the ratio of long term debt to book value of assets. Market value of assets is calculated as calculated as (the book value of total assets -the book value of equity + the market value of equity). Marke/book is market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Sales growth is the one-year inflation-adjusted sales growth. Investment expenditures are the sum of capital expenditures, research and development (R&D) expenditures and net assets from acquisitions scaled by book value of total assets. ADR dummy equals to one if the firm has an ADR listing in the year under consideration. High R&D industry equals to one if the firm operates in the upper tercile industry of all industries ranked by their R&D expenses. High Whited and Wu index equals to one if the firms' Whited and Wu (2006) index is in the upper tercile of all WorldScope firms in the year under consideration. High closely-held shares is equal to one if the firm's insider ownership is in the upper tercile of all worldscope firms in that year. Low ASDI index equals to one if the firm is from a country whose anti-self dealing index is lower than the world median. The currency depreciation dummy equals to one if the country's real exchange rate increased by over 25 percent compared to the value of the exchange rate one year earlier. The low country market return dummy equals to one if the firm's country-level cumulative 12 month stock market return is lower than the world median in that year. 
Table X Determinants of new equity issuances subsequent to the minority block acquisition
Panel A uses logit models to examine the probability that a target firm in the minority block acquisition will issue new equity either simultaneously with or in the subsequent two years of the acquisition. Panel B use Tobit models to investigate the determinants of proceeds from target firm's new equity issues (scaled by their market capitalization) in the subsequent two years of the acquisition. Independent variables include a dummy variable indicating high R&D industry if the firm operates in the upper tercile industry of all industries ranked by their R&D expenditures, a dummy variable indicating a financially constrained firm if the firm pays no dividend in the previous year, sales growth calculated as the one-year inflation adjusted sales growth, a dummy variable indicating a financially constrained firm if the firm's Whited and Wu (2006) index is in the upper tercile, a dummy variable indicating high insider ownership if the firm's insider ownership is higher than the world median, a dummy variable indicating deals of cross-border nature, a dummy variable indicating low ASDI index if the firm is from a country those anti-self dealing index is lower than the world median and a dummy variable indicating high acquirer stock return if the purchasing firm's stock return in the year prior to the acquisition is in the upper quartile of all acquiring firms. The last 2 columns examine the non-US sample. All specifications include year fixed effects with heterskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by firms' two-digit SIC codes. Changes in operating cash flows, sales and investment expenditures during the period (-1, +3) around the acquisition announcement. Comparison portfolios for each target firm are constructed using related industry (fourdigit SIC) size matched firms from WorldScope. If five matching firms are not available at the four-digit SIC level three-digit or two-digit levels are used to obtain a minimum of five firms. Mean statistics are reported after subtracting industry median for the comparison groups. Δ operating cash flows is the industry-adjusted changes in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by average total net assets. Δ Sales is the industry adjusted changes in sales scaled by average total net assets. Δ investment expenditures is the industry adjusted capital expenditures + R&D expenditures + net assets from acquisitions divided by average net assets. To avoid survivorship bias, we require targets to have WorldScope data available in each comparison year over the interval (-1,+3). Sample statistics are reported by a dummy variable indicating whether the target operates in high R&D industries, a dummy variable indicating whether the target is a dividend payer in the fiscal year before the acquisition, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is in the upper tercile of Whited and Wu index, a dummy variable indicating whether the target firm has high insider ownership, whether the acquisition is crossborder, whether the target firm is in countries with low ASDI index and whether the acquirer has high stock returns prior to the acquisition. P-value is in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Ordinary least square regression of industry-adjusted changes in operating cash flow (EBITDA) divided by average net assets, sales growth and changes in investment expenditures during the (-1, +3) year interval relative to corporate block equity purchases. Comparison portfolios for each target firm are constructed using related industry (four-digit SIC) size matched firms from WorldScope. If five matching firms are not available at the four-digit SIC level, threedigit or two-digit levels are used to obtain a minimum of five firms. Median statistics for the comparison groups are subtracted from the target measures. Regressors include a dummy variable indicating whether the target operates in high R&D industries, a dummy variable indicating whether the target is a dividend payer in the fiscal year before the acquisition, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is in the upper tercile of Whited and Wu index, a dummy variable indicating whether the target firm has high insider ownership, whether the acquisition is cross-border, whether the target firm is in countries with low ASDI index and whether the acquirer has high stock returns prior to the acquisition. *, **, *** denotes significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All regressions include year fixed effects.
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